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Marketisation of immigrant
skills assessment in Australia
Anna Boucher
Over the 1990s and 2000s, private actors have played an increasing role
in the selection and integration of new migrants. An individual ap-
plying as a skilled immigrant to Australia must have his or her skills
accredited before lodgment of an application with the Department of
Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP)1. This assessment forms a
vital part of the immigration process for a wide range of visa categories.
Historically, such assessments were undertaken by immigration offi-
cials. Since 1999, the preliminary step of skills assessment of immigrant
applicants has been carried out by 35 different assessing authorities
independent of the department. Some of these authorities are private
Boucher, A. 2015, ‘Marketisation of immigrant skills assessment in Australia’, in
Markets, rights and power in Australian social policy, eds G. Meagher & S. Goodwin,
Sydney University Press, Sydney.
1 The name of the department has changed several times in recent decades.
From 2007–2013, it was called the Department of Immigration and Citizenship;
following the election of the Coalition government in 2013, the name was changed
to Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP 2014a). In this chapter, department
names at the time of writing are given, unless the responsible department at the
time of a reported past event or inquiry was different, and in the case of
institutional authorship.
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professional bodies, others are commercial arms of government agen-
cies. While this trend towards marketisation has been considered in
light of privatised detention centres for asylum seekers (Crock & Berg
2011, pp. 132–33; Crock, Saul & Dastyari 2006), privatisation and mar-
ketisation of the bulk of immigration selection for skilled immigration
in Australia have not been analysed extensively. Yet, given the central-
ity of immigration to Australia’s sovereign identity, and the importance
of skilled immigration within immigration and labour market policy
more broadly, such an assessment is warranted. This chapter outlines
marketisation in the assessment of immigrant skills since 1999 and
evaluates the realisation of key public policy goals in light of this devel-
opment.
The effects of marketisation of skills assessment upon skilled immi-
gration assessment are evaluated using five public policy indicators: i)
the timeliness of skills assessments; ii) the accuracy of decision-making;
iii) the cost shifting that has occurred; iv) the transparency of the skills
assessment process and opportunities for review; and v) the fairness of
the assessment system, across different assessing agencies, both public
and private. These indicators have been selected based on their preva-
lent usage in public policy analysis of privatisation and marketisation
processes. Marketisation is often justified on the basis that expertise in
pricing and business can lead to better and faster delivery of goods and
services (Aman 2009, p. 269; Leunig 2010, p. 160; Quiggin 2010, p. 186;
Webster & Harding 2000, p. 10), although whether this is actually the
case may depend upon whether there is real competition at play (Kel-
man 2009, p. 156). The specialisation that comes with marketisation
can also be seen to increase the accuracy of decision-making (Aman
2009, p. 269). More critically, marketisation has been seen to reduce
the transparency and fairness of policy processes, insofar that certain
forms of public law review are reduced, or hidden from sight (Freeman
1999; Freeman & Minow 2009, pp. 4–5; Kelman 2009, p. 178; Ramia &
Carney 2000; Sapotichne & Smith 2011, p. 89). Aside from the theo-
retical basis for the selection of these indicators, the empirical research
undertaken for this chapter demonstrates their practical importance to
stakeholders engaged in the skilled immigration field, including immi-
grant applicants and their representatives.
Given the dearth of current academic research on how these the-
oretical concerns play out in the area of immigrant skills assessment, a
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range of original research was undertaken for this chapter, coupled with
desk analysis of existing policy documents. First, I undertook a survey
of migrant agents registered with the Migration Institute of Australia
in 2012 to ascertain their perceptions of skilled migration assessment
in the present day and across time. Second, I drew upon elite inter-
views conducted in 2009 with senior immigration officials engaged in
the 1999 policy reforms (Boucher 2011). Third, I analysed the report of
a Joint Standing Committee on Migration review of migrant skills ac-
creditation and assessment – Negotiating the maze (JSC 2006) – and the
government response to that inquiry (JSC 2011). Submissions to this
review were also examined. Finally, I considered several legal cases and
relevant rules pertinent to this area of regulation. This chapter states the
law and application fees as stated in public documents in January 2012.
The public policy context of skills assessments for immigration
purposes
Skilled immigration plays an important role in Australia’s immigration
program and economy more broadly, as structural ageing and skill
gaps in the domestic workforce, particularly in the mineral and re-
source sectors, create labour market pressures. Skilled immigration
selection comprises 65 percent of Australia’s permanent immigration
program and a significant component of Australia’s temporary immi-
gration (DIAC 2011a, p. 3).2 The size of the immigration program is
also significant. In the year 2010 to 2011, 113,725 immigrants entered
Australia under the permanent skilled category and 90,120 under the
temporary skilled category (DIAC 2012a, p. 6, 49). Over the 1990s
and 2000s, Australia’s skilled immigration system has grown in scale
and become more complex in its design through a proliferation of visa
classes and associated rules and provisions (Crock & Berg 2011, Ch 9).
Within this complex and increasingly vital area of labour market activ-
ity, analysis of skills assessments is of broad public policy salience.
2 Together, permanent skilled and temporary skilled entrants comprise around
33 percent of net overseas migration and this is projected to rise to 40 percent by
2014–15 (DIAC 2011b, p. 10). Net overseas migration comprises all immigration
flows minus all emigration flows.
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A successful skills assessment is required prior to lodgment of
an application for points-tested general skilled immigration. As such,
skills assessment is a separate, independent but also necessarily prelim-
inary step prior to the application for a skilled immigration visa. Skills
assessments are required by many classes of skilled visa applicants.3
Skills assessments fulfill a number of important policy functions, pre-
dominately to ensure that ‘the overall objectives of the skilled program
are met in terms of economic benefit to Australia’ (MIA 2005, p. 8).
This is because, at least in principle, a skills assessment should guaran-
tee that the applicant has the necessary skills upon arrival in Australia.
Second, skills assessments provide consumer protection and a gate-
keeping function, including in the ‘high risk’ medical, allied health
and aviation occupations (MIA 2005, p. 8). Australia has undertaken
some form of skills assessment since at least the late 1960s. These
assessments have classically fallen into a white collar/blue collar de-
marcation. In 1969, the Committee on Overseas Professional Qualifi-
cations was established within the Department of Immigration (Iredale
1997, pp. 101–4). This committee originally took the form of an in-
formation body for prospective migrants but later adopted an assess-
ment function.4 In 1989, the National Office of Overseas Skill Recog-
nition (NOOSR) within the Department of Employment, Education
and Training, as it was then known, replaced the committee. NOOSR
staff, located in Canberra, undertook the paper assessments of pro-
fessional occupations. NOOSR also published a variety of papers on
occupational recognition, which were used as guidelines by assessors
3 Applications by recent international student graduates for ongoing residency
require a skills assessment, as do applications under some temporary migration
visas and for some categories of the Employer Nomination Scheme, by which an
employer nominates a migrant for entry to work permanently in Australia (Policy
Advice Manual 3; Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 1, Item 1136(3)(ba)(ii);
Item 1229(3)(aa-ab); Schedule 2, 487. 214; 487.223; 856.213(b). There are several
important exceptions to the requirement to undertake a skills assessment.
Applicants who apply under a Temporary Business (Long Stay) (Subclass 457) visa
sponsored by an employer (457 visa) and who do not work in a trade are not
required to undertake such an assessment. Further, no skills assessment is required
for migrants sponsored under a Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme.
4 Cully and Skladzien (2001, p. 24) note that, prior to 1969, those in white collar
jobs were required to ‘fend for themselves in the market, or rely on … bilateral
arrangements’.
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to identify the ‘usual occupation’ of skilled immigrant applicants. The
assessment of trades was dealt with through the Tradesmen’s Rights
Regulation Act 1946 (Cwlth), which was administered through various
Central Trade Committees and Local Trade Committees. By conven-
tion, these committees were comprised of members from relevant em-
ployer and trade union associations who were responsible for creating
‘standards, policies and recognition criteria’ for trades as well as consid-
ering ‘applications for migration assessments’ (DEWRSB 1998, pp. 5–6)
with immigration officials located overseas (Crock 1998, pp. 103–4;
Cully & Skladzien 2001, p. 86; Iredale 1997, p. 104). Following a legisla-
tive inquiry in 1998, the Tradesmen’s Rights Regulation Act 1946 (Cwlth)
was repealed through the Tradesman’s Rights Regulation Repeal Bill
1999. By the late 1990s, about 60 percent of assessments were under-
taken by immigration officers and the remainder by NOOSR, Trades
Recognition Australia (TRA) and a very small number of external bod-
ies (DIMA 1999a, p. 78).
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, government officials raised con-
cerns over the difficulties for immigration officers in undertaking skills
assessments (CAAIP 1988, pp. 53–54; cited in House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Community Affairs 1996, p. 55). However, it
was not until the election of the Howard Coalition government in 1996
that decisive policy reform was initiated in this area. Marketisation and
privatisation of previously governmental functions occurred across a
number of policy areas at the time (ARC 1998; Aulich 2011; Ramia
& Carney 2001) and within a number of aspects of the immigration
portfolio (DIMA 1999b, p. 31, cited in Crock & Berg 2011, p. 129).
This marketisation was justified on the basis that it would ‘improve ser-
vice delivery by government’ and ‘ensure that resources [were] used
efficiently’. The marketisation of skills assessment in particular was un-
dertaken as part of the review of general skilled immigration, which
overhauled not only the process of skills assessment, but also the points
test for skilled immigration more broadly (DIMA 1999a, p. 76).
A number of arguments were provided by government in favour of
marketisation of skills assessment. First, external skills assessment was
expected to improve the timeliness of skills assessment by separating
out skills assessment from visa processing (DIMA 1999c). Second, out-
sourced skills assessments may be more accurate in their appraisal of
skill than those undertaken by immigration officials. This spoke to the
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difficulty for immigration officials in identifying the ‘usual occupation’
of the applicant, as well as the lack of expertise on the part of immigra-
tion officials in particular skill areas (DIMA 1999a, p. 76, 78). As Mark
Cully and Tom Skladzien (2001, p. 32) argued of the pre-1999 system:
‘This system was regarded as costly (to government) and prone to er-
ror as assessments for many occupations were done by those without
any knowledge of, or training in, the relevant field’. The claim, as put by
Cully and Skladzien (2001, p. 32), is that the new system improved the
accuracy of skill assessments undertaken by departmental officers: ‘The
new system reduces the risk of error by accrediting a competent assess-
ing authority for each occupation on the Skills Occupation List’.
A senior immigration official questioned the accuracy of skill as-
sessments undertaken by his department in more colourful terms:
I saw a case years ago of a gentleman … and this is creative, called
himself a ‘forecourt engineer’. Would you hazard a guess as to what
a ‘forecourt engineer’ does? Petrol pump attendant. You know what
I mean, how do you describe yourself? And immigration officers,
that’s not our game. We are there to process, we are there to apply the
law and the regulations on lots of things, and this is part of our busi-
ness, but not really the core part of our business, because we are not
a skills assessing body. (Interview with official of the Department of
Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra, 24 September 2009)
A final and related argument was that marketisation would reduce cost
to the state, in the sense that an activity once included within visa
assessment is now outsourced and paid for by the migrant applicant
separately as part of the visa application process. As outlined in more
detail below, this may, however, depend upon whether the skills as-
sessment is undertaken by a government body, or a private authority.
Government bodies must operate on a cost recovery basis, requiring a
fee-for-service (DIIRSTE 2013, p. 6), which does not appear to be the
case for private assessing authorities. An official from the Department
of Immigration summarised the benefits of marketisation as follows: ‘It
was beneficial to the migrant, beneficial for the labour market. And it
removed a decision-making role for immigration officers, which really
they weren’t in a position to do’ (Boucher 2011).5
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Following marketisation in 1999, NOOSR was delegated a nar-
rower, oversight function in the skills assessment process. Its role was
redefined as a clearinghouse for information and advice on overseas
qualifications including determining the equivalent Australian stan-
dard of overseas qualifications (Cully & Skladzien 2001, p. 27). In 2014,
NOOSR's name was changed to the Qualifications Recognition Policy
Unit, within the Department of Education and Training (DET n.d.).
TRA retained oversight over most (but not all) of the trade occupations
and has been overseen since 2011 by the Department of Industry and
Science. The Vocational Education Training and Assessment (VE-
TASSESS) provider established in 1997 is the commercial arm of the
Melbourne-based Kangan Batman TAFE (VETASSESS 2013). VE-
TASSESS is responsible for the assessment of the bulk of professional
occupations and some trades (JSC 2006, p. 50), and is a government
business enterprise. While government documentation reveals that VE-
TASSESS is ‘contracted by DIMA [the Department of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs]’ (JSC 2006, p. 50), the exact nature of the contrac-
tual relationship is not clear from this documentation, and an attempt
by the author to interview the head of VETASSESS to clarify the re-
lationship was refused. A range of private professional associations
undertake the remainder of skill assessments. These assessing bodies
are the same organisations responsible for domestic accreditation of
skills of Australian graduates, such as the various Legal Practitioner Ad-
missions Boards, the Architects Accreditation Council of Australia, or
Engineers Australia (DIBP 2014). As such, in many cases, the bodies re-
sponsible for assessing the skills of potential immigrants, are also those
who regulate professions. The power to declare a body as an assessing
authority lies with the Minister for Education or Employment (Migra-
tion Regulations 1994, r2.26B [1–1A]).
Skills assessment had been marketised to assessing agencies for
six years when in 2005, the Joint Standing Committee on Migration
of the Federal Parliament held a parliamentary inquiry into, among
other things, migrant skills recognition. Entitled Negotiating the maze:
Review of arrangements for overseas skills recognition, upgrading and
licensing (JSC 2006), henceforth Negotiating the maze, the inquiry in-
5 Interview with senior official of the Department of Immigration and
Citizenship, Canberra, 30 October 2009.
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vestigated the complex systems of skills assessment and the structural
barriers to skills recognition for new Australians upon settlement (JSC
2006, pp. ix–x). The inquiry followed a series of federal, state and aca-
demic inquiries into skills assessment and migrant skill recognition
held over the preceding two decades, which had highlighted the need
for ongoing attention to these issues (JSC 2006, p. xxx). Specifically,
following To make a contribution: Review of skilled labour migration
programs, a separate inquiry into general skilled immigration in 2005,
the then Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Senator
Amanda Vanstone, sought the agreement of the Joint Standing Com-
mittee on Migration to review skills recognition (JSC 2006, p. xxxi).
Five years later the Gillard Labor government responded to the Negoti-
ating the maze inquiry and accepted some but not all of the recommen-
dations (JSC 2011). Details of the inquiry and subsequent government
responses are canvassed below. First, I set out the details of the survey I
undertook with members of the Migration Institute of Australia.
Empirical approach: A survey of members of the Migration Institute
of Australia
One important source for the analysis in this section of this chapter
is an original survey administered electronically via SurveyMonkey in
January 2012 to all Migration Institute of Australia (MIA) members
working in the field of skilled immigration. The MIA assisted in ad-
ministering the survey to ensure the anonymity of its members. There
were 249 responses to the survey, which represents an estimated 15 per-
cent response rate of eligible MIA members. Respondents to the survey
work with both public and private assessing bodies and some of the
respondents have been employed in the field prior to 1999. Migration
agents were selected as a source of expertise on the issue of skills assess-
ment for a number of reasons. First, migration agents are responsible
for submitting the majority of skilled migration applications. On most
recent estimates, migration agents lodge between 24 and 100 percent
of relevant skilled immigration visas, depending on the particular visa
subclass (DIAC 2012b). As a group, migration agents therefore pos-
sess considerable knowledge in the area of skills assessment. Second,
given this expertise, migrant agents are more likely to understand the
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Table 9.1: Assessing bodies most used by migrant agents
Assessing body Most used Second most used
Trade Recognition Australia (TRA) 49.6% 20.0%
Vocational Education and Training As-
sessment Services (VETASSESS)
56.3% 32.1%
Australian Computer Society (ACS) 33.6% 14.9%
Engineers Australia 24.2% 11.2%
Note: These percentages do not add up to 100 as respondents in some cases se-
lected more than one organisation for the most used. The Department of
Immigration does not provide a table of the distribution of skills assessments
across all assessing bodies.
complexities of the skilled immigration system than their clients, who
have only undergone their own, singular immigration application ex-
perience. Third, recruitment of migrant agents was assisted through the
MIA, the peak representative body for migration agents.
Respondents were asked both closed and open questions about
their involvement and experience of skill assessments, across a number
of assessing bodies (public and private) and about their views on the
efficiency, cost, accuracy, review rights and fairness of skill assessment.
Depending upon their length of engagement in the field, agents were
also asked to compare skill assessments before and after 1999. Although
there are limitations in surveying agents about their views on assess-
ment that occurred over 10 years ago, this was the best available
method to compare policy indicators across time.
Table 9.1 shows the assessing agencies identified by respondents
as the most used and the second most used. As the table makes clear,
the majority of respondents identified TRA and VETASSESS as the
most used assessing bodies, while the private Australian Computer So-
ciety (ACS) and Engineers Australia (EA) were the third and fourth
most used assessing authorities. Nonetheless, given that respondents
identified over 32 of the 35 organisations responsible for skill assess-
ment across the survey, a variety of public and private authorities were
represented in the responses and accordingly, in the analysis in this
chapter. Unfortunately, these response details from the survey cannot
9 Marketisation of immigrant skills assessment in Australia
301
be compared against agency details of the number of assessments un-
dertaken each year, as assessing agencies do not all make this informa-
tion publicly available on their websites.
Analysis
Drawing upon this survey data and the desk analysis of major gov-
ernment inquiries into skills assessment, the remainder of this chapter
assesses marketisation of skills assessment against a number of key pub-
lic policy indicators: timeliness, accuracy, cost-shifting, accountability
and transparency, and, finally, the fairness of skill assessments. The ra-
tionale for each of these indictors is set out in each section below.
Timeliness
Perhaps one of the most prominent arguments in favour of marketisa-
tion and privatisation of government services is that it improves time-
liness. Such improvements may arise from the specialisation that can
occur within the private sector, as a result of particular expertise in
pricing and business (Aman 2009, p. 269) and in terms of better, faster
work practices (Webster & Harding 2000, p. 10, cited in Chalmers &
Davis 2001, p. 75) and service delivery (Leunig 2010). As noted above,
arguments around improved service delivery were presented in favour
of the marketisation of skills assessment in 1999 (DIMA 1999c). In
fact, marketisation became the status quo in the migration setting more
broadly ‘unless there were clear reasons for not doing so’ (DIMA 2000,
p. 22, cited in Crock & Berg 2011, p. 131).
Insofar that the skills assessment process in Australia is perceived
as more streamlined than in other immigrant selecting countries, the
marketisation of skills assessment may also have made Australia a more
attractive destination country for skilled immigrants (Cully &
Skladzien 2001, p. 11). Given that a successful skills assessment is the
necessary first step for a successful application for skilled migration,
it is clear that any delay in skills assessments will also delay final pro-
cessing times. This can be particularly problematic when an applicant
is relying upon points under the skilled immigration points test for age.
These points diminish if the processing times are extended, as the appli-
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cant ages. This may appear to be a minor issue, yet given the high pass
mark for the points test for Skilled-Independent visas, processing times
can actually be decisive in whether an application for skilled immigra-
tion is successful or not. A delay in processing can also see an applicant
lose their temporary provisional visa status in some instances.
It is clear that the processing period for skill assessments is a key
measure of timeliness that holds ramifications not only for the admin-
istration of the immigration program at large, but also for individual
applicants. Reduction in processing times was seen as one key advan-
tage of marketisation by departmental officials (Interview by author
with senior official of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship,
Canberra, 30 October 2009). Yet, concern over processing times have
persisted since and had already been raised in submissions to a Joint
Standing Committee Inquiry into skills accreditation for new migrants,
the Negotiating the maze inquiry in 2005–6 (see ILAA 2005, p. 6, pp.
113–14). The survey of migration agents undertaken for this chapter
reveals large differences in perceived processing times across assessing
bodies, and concerns around timeliness with some assessing agencies.
Given sensitivity around this issue, it is unsurprising that assessment
bodies do not advertise this information on their websites.
As such, we must rely upon survey results, which provide an initial
indication of processing times. Respondents were asked about the time
taken on average for application processing, by the authority with
which the respondent had the most dealings. The survey offered the
time periods show in Table 9.2. As this table makes clear, the reported
average processing times for skills assessment as reported in the survey
are between three and six months.
Concerns over processing times were raised by 40 percent of re-
spondents in a general open field question.6 Further, concerns were
raised over processing times for both private and public assessing bod-
ies. Qualitative responses to this open question indicated that pro-
cessing times change quite dramatically depending upon the current
pressures on the immigration system as a whole and due to changes in
6 This open field question asked ‘Are there any further comments you would like
to make about the skills assessment process that have not been covered in the
survey?’ and gave respondents the opportunity to provide qualitative feedback on
their experience with skills assessment.
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Table 9.2: Average time for skills assessments by assessing bodies
Length of time Response (percent) Response (count)
Less than one month 8.5% 21
One to two months 38.9% 96
Three to six months 48.6% 120
In excess of six months 4.0% 10
100% 247
N = 247
selection rules, such as a new requirement introduced in 2011 that skill
authorities assess work experience as well as professional qualifications
for general skilled immigration. Those migration agents who had been
active since before 1999 were asked to reflect on differences in skills
assessment since marketisation. Those respondents were more likely
to find that there had been a slowing of assessment times since 1999
(25 percent) than a speeding up of times over the same period (nine
percent). However, over the last decade, the entire system of skilled
immigration has become much more complex, meaning that changes
in processing times before and after 1999 should not simply be attrib-
uted to the marketisation process. More subtly, marketisation may have
affected the speed at various stages of the application process, as one re-
spondent to the survey pointed out:
In our opinion, the outsourcing process has led to improved post-
lodgment processing times for skilled immigration applicants, but
has caused significant delays and difficulties in skilled immigration
applicants’ pre-lodgment procedures. For instance, applicants cannot
lodge a subclass 885 [Skilled-Independent] visa application until
they have obtained a positive skills assessment result from skills
assessment authority prior to application. This very often causes sig-
nificant delays in pre-lodgment as some skills assessment authorities
take up to three to four months to process an application. However,
once the positive skills assessment result is available, it could be
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submitted to DIBP to speed up the post-lodgment processing time-
frame.
Accuracy
One of the strongest arguments in favour of marketisation of skills as-
sessment was that it would increase the reliability and accuracy of this
activity. When asked about their views on the effects of marketisation
upon the accuracy of assessments, 43 percent of respondents who have
worked in the field since before 1999 said that they believed that the
process had increased accuracy. Eighteen percent said it led to less ac-
curate skills assessments. Thirty-nine percent believed that it had no
effect on the accuracy of skills assessments. The qualitative comments
suggested that concerns over accuracy arise for both public and pri-
vate assessing bodies, but particularly for VETASSESS, a government
business enterprise that, as noted, is responsible for a large percentage
of skill assessments. The survey revealed fewer concerns over accuracy
with the smaller, professional assessing bodies. This suggests that at
least with regard to the accuracy of assessments, the specialisation that
occurs through marketisation may have led to better outcomes in skills
assessment for some occupational groupings.
Cost shifting
The marketisation of skills assessment has led to a deflection of the cost
of assessment from the Department of Immigration to the individual
applicant. Prior to 1999, the cost of assessment was built into the overall
cost of visa applications, as the Department of Immigration had over-
sight over this entire process. Since 1999, the two-step system means
that the applicant must pay both for the skills assessment and separately
for the visa application. Marketisation amounts to a form of cost de-
flection and is consistent with federal government cost recovery policy
in place in 2002. As a recent policy document summarises, the ‘under-
pinning principle’ of cost recovery ‘is that entities should set charges to
recover all the costs of products or services where it is efficient and ef-
fective to do so, where the beneficiaries are a narrow and identifiable
group’ (DIIRSTE 2013, p. 6). In light of this policy, a recent draft review
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of TRA’s pricing for skills assessment recommends increased fees across
most visa classes (DIIRSTE 2013, p. 12).
Visa charges have also increased significantly across the immi-
gration field since the late 1990s (Crock & Berg 2011, p. 155). One
respondent in the survey commented of these changes: ‘It seems to me
that the assessment of migrants has become big business. Considering
the costs involved in migrating and settling, I believe the assessments
charges are at the most extreme’. The suggestion here is that assess-
ing authorities are charging large and perhaps incommensurate fees
for skills assessment, relative to the time it takes to undertake such as-
sessment. Particular concerns were raised by respondents to the survey
about the implications of these high costs for applicants from develop-
ing countries, with the suggestion from one respondent that individuals
from these countries ‘simply cannot afford to pay for a formal skills
assessment’. This resonates with findings in the Negotiating the maze in-
quiry that there is significant variation across assessing bodies in fee
charges and that ‘a number of participants to the inquiry commented
on the costs of overseas skills recognition’ (JSC 2006, p. 114).
Analysis of top assessing agencies indicates skills assessment fees
vary dramatically across the top 10 assessing bodies, from as low as
$200 for some forms of skills assessment with the ACS to up to $737
with VETASSESS. The ‘Job Ready Program’, which allows recent inter-
national student graduates to gain domestic employment experience
and a skills assessment as a combined package, can be as high as $2000
(TRA 2011a, p. 8). The range in initial fees for the top 10 assessing bod-
ies identified in the survey are set out in Table 9.3.
Table 9.3 shows that there is considerable variation in fees, even
within VETASSESS, where initial fees range from $330 to $737, de-
pending upon the occupations. The table only presents initial fees to
allow for comparability, although in fact, when the full range of fees is
included, costs increase significantly. Some of the smaller associations,
which are not represented in the top 10 skills assessing bodies reported
in Table 9.3, have even higher fees. For instance, the Australian Den-
tal Council requires all applicants who have not completed dentistry
qualifications in Australia, Ireland, the United Kingdom or Canada,
to undertake two clinical examinations prior to skills assessment. The
first preliminary examination costs $1,100 and the second $6,615 (ADC
2012). As the Immigration Lawyers’ Association of Australasia (ILAA
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Table 9.3: Cost of initial assessment of top 10 assessing bodies. For sources and
notes, see appendix at the end of the chapter
Assessing body Cost of initial assess-
ment
1. VETASSESS $330–$737
2. TRA $300
3. ACS $200–$550
4. Engineers Australia $605
5. Certified Practising Accountants of Australia $475
6. Institute of Charted Accountants in Australia $400–$550
7. Australian Nursing and Midwifery Council $346–$450
8. Institute of Public Accountants $400–$600
9. Australian Institute of Management $475
10. Australian Institute of Welfare and Community
Workers
$500
2005, p. 6) pointed out in its submission to the Negotiating the maze in-
quiry, high fees charged by some assessing authorities may constitute
protectionist obstacles to the inflow of skilled immigrant labour into
Australia, rather than representing a genuine fee for services. One re-
spondent to the survey suggested that if the system was truly competi-
tive (with several assessing agencies competing for skill assessments in
the same area) that fees would not be so high. Yet, as private assessment
agencies are often also professional peak bodies, there is frequently
only one assessing agency for a relevant skill assessment, rendering any
competition non-existent.7 This raises some concerns over professional
closure by some professional bodies. Yet, without further research, this
possibility cannot be comprehensively assessed.
7 An important exception is accounting, where the Certified Practising
Accountants of Australia (CPA Australia), the Institute of Charted Accountants in
Australia (ICAA) and the Institute of Public Accountants (IPA) all may assess
applications.
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Accountability and transparency
Accountability and transparency, central goals of public regulation, are
often seen as being under threat following privatisation and marketisa-
tion of previously public functions. In essence, this critique relates to
the restricted capacity for public accountability mechanisms, secured
through the democratic logic of public power, to translate into the pri-
vate sphere of regulation (Freeman 1999, p. 6). The central question is
whether similar – or equivalent – accountability mechanisms can be es-
tablished between private actors and citizens as between public bodies
and citizens. In a related but separate fashion, critics of privatisation
and marketisation ask whether the opportunity for public engagement
in decision-making is reduced or narrowed through these processes
(Aman 2009, p. 277). The central issue here is the extent of transparency
in decisions when private rather than public bodies undertake these
processes. The concern is that by taking decision-making outside of the
realm of public power, and therefore legislative and executive politics,
there may be a depoliticisation of the relevant policy issues, in turn con-
tributing to a lack of transparency in assessment of that process (Aman
2009).
Prior to 1999, the Immigration Review Tribunal could review the
facts considered in making skill assessments (Mak v IRT [1994] 48 FCR
314; see also Crock 1998, pp. 104–5). Since 1999, cases of this nature
cannot be brought before public law tribunals, for reasons outlined be-
low. Any legal concerns can only be pursued on the basis of contractual
breaches. Before assessing the details of the legal decision that limited
public law review of skills assessments, it is important to outline the
implications for applicants of this change for the cost of review, the
scope of grounds for review and for available remedies. The capacity to
seek review on the basis of particular public law grounds (such as er-
ror of law, improper exercise of power or taking into account irrelevant
considerations) is denied under a contractual case, which focuses on
breach of the contractual agreement and monetary remedies. Further,
it is more expensive to bring a private contractual case than to bring a
public tribunal matter to the Migration Review Tribunal (as it is now
known).
The restriction upon public law review of skills assessments is a
product of a court case conducted shortly after the 1999 changes. In
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Silveira v Australian Institute of Management [2001] FCA 803, Justice
Emmett of the Federal Court of Australia held that a decision by an
assessing authority was not a ‘decision under an enactment’, thereby
rendering it ineligible for administrative law review (Administrative
Decisions [Judicial Review] Act 1977 [Cwlth], s3[a]). Justice Emmett
did not distinguish between public and private assessing bodies (para-
graphs 40–41). Instead his decision turned on the fact that the skills
assessment was viewed as a mere ‘step along the way in a course of
reasoning’, rather than either the final determination or a ‘condition
precedent to a reviewable decision’. If Ms Silveira were to have recourse
against the decision of the institute, this lay in contract rather than ad-
ministrative law (paragraph 47). The case was unsuccessful on appeal
(Silveira v Australian Institute of Management [2001] FCA 1358).
The notion that a skills assessment is not a necessary first step for
a decision regarding skilled immigration is highly artificial. Without a
skills assessment, an immigration applicant is unable to lodge an ap-
plication for many immigration visas. Despite these shortcomings with
the Silveira reasoning, the case stands. Since the Silveira decision, no
cases have tested the proposition that given their different legal struc-
tures to private assessing bodies, decisions by TRA or VETASSESS
could be a ‘decision under an enactment’ and therefore subject to public
law review. Yet, there are reasons to believe that the Silveira decision
might now be challenged both on this and several other bases. A recent
High Court of Australia case, M61/201E v Commonwealth; Plaintiff
M69 of 2010 v Commonwealth (2010) 85 ALJR 133 (Wizard hereafter),
found that the decision by an external refugee review body, which em-
ploys case assessors from the private company, Wizard People Pty Ltd,
was reviewable. This decision did not adjudge directly on the issue of
the general reviewability under administrative law of decisions made
by private companies contracted by the Department of Immigration.
Yet, it would appear to leave the door open in this regard (see Crock &
Ghezelbash 2011, pp. 106–7). This decision challenges the Silveria de-
cision in two respects. First, it suggests that the immigration decisions
of private assessing bodies contracted by the Minister for Immigration
might be reviewable. Second, Wizard indicates that, although the ex-
act review process of the independent reviewers is not provided for in
the Migration Act or regulations, it is still a form of delegated govern-
mental power and therefore might be considered a ‘decision under an
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enactment’ for the purposes of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial
Review) Act 1977 (Cwlth), s3.
Nonetheless, in light of the current restriction against adminis-
trative review, the capacity for internal review within assessing bodies
must also be considered. Review of original decisions is available, al-
though at least in the current survey, was not reported as utilised by
the majority of migrant applicants. Fifty-two percent of respondents
to the survey indicated that they do not seek review either because
the outcome for the client was positive, or because clients did not
instruct review. Qualitative responses to the survey indicate that migra-
tion agents have a number of reasons for not seeking internal review
on behalf of their clients. These include the cost and timing of reviews;
a perceived lack of transparency in the review process; the inability
to lodge new evidence as part of a review; a belief that it is easier to
lodge a new application rather than to seek review of the original de-
cision; delays in reimbursement for the cost of a successful review; and
the general concern that a review process was not fully independent
of the original decision-maker. For instance, many respondents to the
survey complained that internal review failed to take relevant factors
into consideration. Yet, taking relevant considerations into account is
a well-established basis for review under administrative review (Ad-
ministrative Decisions [Judicial Review] Act 1977 [Cwlth], s5[2][b]). The
majority of agents reported that their clients paid between $200 and
$400 for a review, although in all cases where the review was success-
ful, the full cost of the review was eventually recouped. Only a very
small number of respondents (eight out of 247) reported using political
means of review, by appealing either to the Department of Employ-
ment and Workplace Relations, the Department of Immigration, or
the Minister for Immigration and none used the Commonwealth Om-
budsman. Interestingly, as TRA is a public body, applicants may bring
complaints from TRA to the Commonwealth Ombudsman. No respon-
dent in the survey had used the Ombudsman for review process. Nor
is skills assessment for immigration purposes mentioned in the lat-
est Commonwealth Ombudsman annual report (2012), although it has
been referred to in previous reports (2009) and several high-profile
matters in this area have been referred to the Ombudsman previously
(Skelton 2012).
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Migration agents who appealed decisions on behalf of their clients
expressed different levels of satisfaction with different assessing bodies
and their internal review procedures. Respondents were asked in open-
ended questions to reflect on their views of the review process. Of the
46 open responses to this question, only two expressed satisfaction.
Many saw the review process as too lengthy and costly, lacking in
transparency, failing to provide clear reasons for rejection, inconsistent
across applicants or inefficient. There have been complaints about a
lack of an open review procedure at TRA (ILAA 2005; MIA 2005, pp.
21–22). The Immigration Lawyers’ Association of Australasia argued
that TRA and the ACS were not always clear about the reasons for their
decisions. VETASSESS, on the other hand, was viewed by the Immi-
gration Lawyers’ Association of Australasia as quite good in this regard
(ILAA 2005, p. 23). It is clear that there is considerable variation across
assessing bodies in terms of the cost, speed and reasons given for the
determination of internal reviews. On this basis, some respondents to
the survey argued that all assessing bodies should be subject to admin-
istrative review. One respondent argued:
There must be more administrative law accountability of the process
performed by the skills assessing authorities. They are performing a
segment of the government’s administrative process, and therefore
should be accountable to the same standards of procedural fairness,
and natural justice. There should be an independent appeal tribunal
for skills assessment outcomes.
Accountability also plays out at a larger level with regard to the central
issue of oversight of assessing bodies. The lack of clear monitoring of
the field of assessment bodies was raised as a key concern within the
Negotiating the maze inquiry. According to the inquiry, there was an
absence of statutory clarity over whether the Department of Immigra-
tion or the Department of Education, Science and Training (now the
Department of Industry and Science) was responsible for oversight of
assessing agencies and that ‘the general “washing of hands” of the prob-
lem [was] a concern’ (JSC 2006, p. 94). While DIS is clearly responsible
for approving a body as an assessing authority under the Migration
Regulations 1994, regulation 2.26B, the responsibility for ongoing mon-
itoring of these authorities is unclear (JSC 2006, pp. 97–99). Some but
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not all of the inquiry’s other recommendations regarding monitoring
and oversight appear to have been implemented. For instance, the in-
quiry recommended that the immigration department ensure that its
Australian Skills Recognition Information website ‘provide an overview
of the various organisations involved in administering, monitoring and
delivering overseas skill recognition services’ (JSC 2006, p. xix). This
has been undertaken (JSC 2011, p. 8). In contrast, the review also
recommended that the DEST undertake a review of fees charged by
assessing bodies to ‘ensure these fees are reasonable and have been de-
termined on a not-for-profit basis’ (JSC 2006, p. xxii). However, it is
unclear whether such monitoring is being pursued and the basis upon
which private assessing authorities determine fee structures remains
opaque.
Fairness
This chapter has identified some concerns over consistency in treat-
ment of migrant applicants, within and across assessing bodies. This
goes to the central issue of fairness, which can be viewed as a key public
policy goal (Freeman 1999, p. 13). It could be argued that fairness is a
difficult policy goal to achieve in the immigration field, which by na-
ture is concerned with discriminating between applicants (Dauvergne
2009). However, while immigration is clearly about selection, it is im-
portant that there is consistency in the way that applicants are treated
in the process of such selection. In 1996, the House of Representa-
tives Standing Committee on Community Affairs (1996, p. 58, cited in
Iredale 1997, p. 107) identified concerns over migrant applicants having
to deal with two agencies (NOOSR and TRA) in the process of skilled
immigration applications. This ‘silo’ effect is now even greater. The di-
versification of assessing bodies post-1999, and the proliferation of visa
categories that has accompanied an increasingly complex immigration
program, raises concerns over a related diversification in the quality of
service provided to applicants.
In its submission to the Negotiating the maze inquiry, the Immi-
gration Lawyers’ Association of Australasia (ILAA 2005, p. 6) raised
concerns about the diversity of approaches and the resultant inequality
across assessing bodies. Although not directly questioned about their
perceptions of fairness in the skills assessment process, respondents to
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the open-ended question in the survey also expressed concern about
inconsistent decisions, sometimes even within the same assessing bod-
ies. Issues with inconsistency can also play out in more subtle ways,
for instance in different interpretations of English language qualifica-
tions and requirements by different assessing bodies.8 Such concerns
arise both with regards to public and privately run assessing bodies.
Given that TRA is responsible for a large proportion of assessments, it
is unsurprising that more complaints are raised about TRA than other
agencies in this regard.
Fairness can also be considered in terms of whether migrant ap-
plicants are treated equally by assessing authorities, depending upon
their existing qualifications. MIA agents were asked whether they ex-
perienced differences in processing times for different occupations
processed by the same agency. Twenty-one percent of respondents said
that they had and 60 percent said that there was no major difference
across occupations, while for another 19 percent, the question was ir-
relevant as they only dealt with one occupational group. Looking at the
qualitative responses, some migrant agents reported that certain occu-
pations, such as accountancy, were being processed faster than others,
while others noted that it had less to do with the particular occupation
and more to do with the vagaries of the individual assessing officer.
For other respondents, the country of origin of existing applicant
qualifications were central, with those from non-English-speaking and
non-Western countries at a distinct disadvantage in terms of process-
ing, given a perceived mismatch among assessors between applicant
qualifications and Australian qualifications. As such, the nature of the
client, as well as the assessing authority, may affect processing times.
The extent of this problem could be further examined by surveying in-
dividual immigrants about their experience of skills assessment. Such
an assessment of the role of country of origin may be necessary in order
to reduce any discriminatory bias in immigration policy – a central
tenet of immigration selection since the end to race-based selection in
1973 (DIAC 2009). Marketisation of the skills assessment field has led,
as noted, to an array of public and private assessment bodies. It is im-
8 This concern was raised by a number of migration agents at an event on skills
assessment attended by the author: Skills Assessment Forum, Migration Institute
of Australia, 11 October 2011.
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portant to ensure that these bodies provide equal adherence to these
central principles of the immigration program, despite not being under
the direct remit of the Department of Immigration.
Conclusion
The immigration regulation field in Australia has changed dramatically
since 1999. The immigration system has become more complex, there
are far higher rates of skilled and temporary migration and there is a
greater emphasis on skill of new entrants within the immigration pro-
gram as a whole than 10 years ago. In light of these developments and
the marketisation of skills assessment in 1999, examination of the skills
assessment process is essential. It is clear that the marketisation doc-
umented in this chapter differs in important ways from other policy
areas considered in this book. For while responsibility for skills as-
sessment has moved away from the DIBP, and while there has been
a diversification of public and private providers, much of the assess-
ment function is still undertaken by public, or semi-public entities.
Nonetheless, as documented in this chapter, the diversification in as-
sessing authorities raises some important policy issues.
This chapter has not considered the relationship between pre-mi-
gration assessment and skills accreditation after arrival in Australia. In
fact, the marketisation of skills assessment was partially justified on the
basis that the organisations undertaking skills assessment for migratory
purposes are also often the registration bodies for professional accred-
itation. Accordingly, one argument in favour of the 1999 changes was
that it would improve new migrant labour market outcomes by ensur-
ing that skills assessments and professional accreditation would be cou-
pled in the one stage (see Cully & Skladzien 2001, p. 7). Although not
the focus of this chapter, it is important to acknowledge that evidence to
the contrary has also emerged. The Negotiating the maze report (2006,
pp. 109–13, pp. 160–65) and recent research by Lesleyanne Hawthorne
(2011) identify ongoing obstacles to accreditation faced by newly ar-
rived migrants in Australia, even for those who had undertaken skills
assessments as part of the migration process. A comprehensive analysis
of the enduring disjuncture between pre- and post-migration skills as-
sessment and recognition is a separate topic, which touches only in part
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upon marketisation issues, and is also related to the federal system of
trade recognition, and a raft of other governance concerns.
The survey of migration agents presented in this chapter, coupled
with secondary desk analysis, suggests that marketisation has been
mixed in its achievement of key policy goals. Marketisation appears to
have deflected the cost of skills assessment from the Department of Im-
migration onto individual migrant applicants and their sponsors. Re-
view rights have also been truncated, in that administrative review op-
portunities have been removed and internal reviews offer fewer reme-
dies. The multitude of agencies now responsible for assessment, with
differing costs, procedures and processing times, raises concerns about
consistency across immigration applicants as well as concerns over
oversight and monitoring of the entire industry. Despite these appar-
ently negative outcomes, there is also evidence, particularly with regard
to specialised assessing agencies, that the accuracy of skills assessments
has increased and in some cases, that assessment times have been re-
duced.
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Appendix
Sources and notes to Table 9.3.
• ACS (2012); ANMC (2012); ACWA (2012, 3); AIM (2012); CPA
(2012); EA (2012); ICCA (2012); IPA (2012) VETASSESS (2012);
TRA (2011b, 5).
• Fees vary within associations depending upon the particular skills
assessment sought, whether a standard or fast-tracked application
processing period is requested, and sometimes, the relevant visa cat-
egory. This table reflects the general range of fees. These fees are
based on those reported at the time of publication, but are subject to
indexed increases.
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